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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-3-102 of the Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW RELATED TO UDOT'S 
APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court correctly determined that Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc. ("MVC") is entitled to damages resulting from UDOT's refusal to allow 
ribbon paving on significant portions of the 1-215 Project. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined that the State of Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") breached the contract by interfering with and 
changing the means and methods by which MVC/Southwest Asphalt Paving 
("Southwest") should have been allowed to pave the subject project and failing to pay for 
extra costs associated with said interference and change. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly determined that MVC/Southwest's 
numerous verbal notices to UDOT throughout the course of the project which verbal 
notices consisted of MVC/Southwest informing UDOT that prohibiting MVC/Southwest 
from using the ribbon paving method would result in increased costs, production 
inefficiencies, downtime, scheduling problems and other negative impacts to 
MVC/Southwest, constituted sufficient notice, thereby excusing MVC/Southwest from 
complying with the strict notice provisions of the contract. 
4. Whether the trial court correctly determined that UDOT modified, waived and 
l 
is estopped from relying on the strict written notice provisions of the contract due to 
UDOT's course of conduct before, during and after the subject project. 
MVC/Southwest concurs with the standard of appellate review cited by UDOT as 
it relates to the above issues. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW RELATED TO 
MEADOW VALLEY'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the contract does not allow 
MVC/Southwest a 3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on each of the two separate layers 
(lifts) of asphalt pavement installed by MVC/Southwest. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law 
and a trial court's legal conclusions regarding a contract are afforded no deference and 
will be reviewed for correctness. Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Investment 
Management L.L.C., 2006 UT App 33 L H 14; 153P.3d714. 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was preserved at R. 1425: 950-953, 1043-1046. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that November 1? 2004, is the 
operative date for prejudgment interest to begin accruing on damages awarded to 
MVC/Southwest. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest 
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Iron Head Construction, 
Inc. v. Gurney, 2008 UT App 1, Tj 5; 176 P.3d 453 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was preserved at R. 1425: 968-969, 1048. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: MVC entered into a contract with UDOT for the 
construction of a multiple lane highway project on 1-215 from Redwood Road to 300 East 
("1-215 Project"). MVC subcontracted all paving work for the 1-215 Project to 
Southwest. The 1-215 Project Specifications contained no restrictions as to the means 
and methods of paving to be used on the 1-215 Project. Accordingly, Southwest based its 
bid on the premise that it would be allowed to utilize the ribbon style method of paving 
throughout the entire 1-215 Project. Ribbon paving is the most cost effective and 
common form of paving used in highway and interstate construction improvement 
projects. 
At a pre-pave meeting in June of 2003, UDOT informed MVC/Southwest for the 
first time that MVC/Southwest would not be allowed to utilize ribbon paving on a 
significant portion of the Project, claiming that the 1-215 Project Specifications did not 
allow ribbon paving in areas where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical 
separation grade between traffic lanes. Southwest personnel immediately informed 
UDOT at that meeting and several times thereafter during the course of the 1-215 Project 
that not allowing MVC/Southwest to ribbon pave would result in increased paving costs, 
production inefficiencies, scheduling problems and other negative impacts. In response, 
UDOT re-iterated its position that the 1-215 Project Specifications did not allow ribbon 
paving on the majority of the project and directed MVC/Southwest to continue work. As 
a result, MVC/Southwest had to utilize block paving, a different and more expensive and 
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inefficient method of paving, which resulted in substantial added costs to 
MVC/Southwest. 
As it relates to asphalt thickness issues, according to the contract, the total 
thickness of the asphalt on the 1-215 Project was to be five inches thick. However, the 
contract allowed for a 3/8 of an inch deficiency in thickness on each individual lift (layer) 
paved by MVC/Southwest. Prior to paving, UDOT and MVC/Southwest agreed that the 
five inches of asphalt would be laid in two separate lifts on separate days. 
MVC/Southwesf s position is that it was entitled to a 3/8 of an inch deficiency on each 
individual lift, for a total of 3/4 of an inch deficiency on the total five inches of thickness. 
UDOT disagreed, claiming that MVC/Southwest was only entitled to a 3/8 of an inch 
deficiency on the total five inches of thickness. After a majority of the paving work was 
completed, UDOT informed MVC/Southwest that several areas of the paving were 
deficient in thickness and assessed penalties against MVC/Southwest in the amount of 
$166,416.00. MVC/Southwest disputed such because the asphalt measurements were 
within the thickness deficiency allowances under the contract. 
UDOT refused to pay for MVC/Southwesf s increased costs and deducted 
$166,416.00 for its thickness deficiency claim. As a result, MVC and Fisher Industries, 
Southwesf s parent company, entered into a Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement 
wherein MVC assigned and granted Southwest the right to prosecute MVC/Southwesf s 
claims in the name of MVC. 
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II. Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below: On September 24, 2004, 
MVC/Southwest filed a Formal Claim against UDOT for MVC/Southwest's increased 
costs and for unwarranted thickness penalties accessed by UDOT against 
MVC/Southwest. UDOT's Claims Board of Review considered MVC/Southwest's 
claims on the merits and recommended they be denied. UDOT's Deputy Director, Carlos 
Braceras, adopted the recommendations of UDOT's Claims Review Board and denied 
MVC/Southwest's claims. 
In response, MVC/Southwest filed suit against UDOT in the Third District Court. 
At trial, the court found that the contract did not restrict paving methods and clearly and 
unambiguously allowed MVC/Southwest to utilize ribbon style paving on the entire 1-215 
Project. The trial court found that UDOT breached the contract by not allowing 
MVC/Southwest to ribbon pave and by refusing to pay for increased costs suffered by 
MVC/Southwest as a result of not being able to ribbon pave. The trial court found that 
MVC/Southwest incurred significant increased costs as a result of UDOT's breach, and 
found that UDOT received actual notice of the increased costs and negative impacts on 
several occasions during the course of the 1-215 Project, but directed MVC/Southwest to 
proceed with the work. The trial court awarded MVC damages in the amount of 
$548,832.52 and found that MVC was entitled to 10% per annum interest on its awarded 
damages of $548,832.52. However, the trial court ruled that prejudgment interest did not 
begin to accrue until November 1, 2004, which was approximately one year after 
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MVC/Southwest had completed the 1-215 Project and determined its increased costs. 
The prejudgment interest awarded by the trial Court totaled $225,247.06. 
The trial court denied MVCs thickness penalty claim of $166,416.00. In doing 
so, the trial court found that the contract specifications relating to allowable thickness 
deviations were less than clear, but agreed with UDOT's position that MVC/Southwest 
was not entitled to more than a 3/8 of an inch deficiency on the total five inches of 
thickness. 
III. Statement of Facts 
A. Contractual Relationship Between the Parties 
1. In the fall of 2002, MVC entered into a written contract with UDOT 
for the construction of a multiple lane highway (with exits, entries and shoulders) on I-
215 from Redwood Road to 300 East ("1-215 Project"). (R. 2, 457, 1496). 
2. MVC entered into two subcontracts (one entitled "Purchase Agreement 
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc." and the other entitled "Meadow Valley 
Subcontractors, Inc. Subcontract Agreement") with Fisher Sand and Gravel Company 
d/b/a Fisher Industries ("Fisher"), wherein Fisher agreed to perform all paving operations 
on the 1-215 Project. (R. 1424: 494, 503; R. 1496; Trial Ex. 8 & 9). 
3. Southwest, a division of Fisher, was delegated the task of performing the 
paving operations. (R. 1422: 319, 362, 381, 460; R. 1497; Trial Ex. 8 & 9). 
B. Project Specifications, Paving Methods & Bid History 
4. Prior to entering into the two subcontracts with MVC, Mike Moehn, 
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Vice-President of Southwest, reviewed the 1-215 Project Specifications. (R. 515; R. 
1421: 22-23; R. 1497). 
5. The Project Specifications contained no restrictions as to the method or 
means of asphalt paving to be used on the 1-215 Project. (R. 515; R. 1421:26; R. 1422: 
324-325; R. 1424: 697, 777; R. 1497). 
6. As there were no restrictions on paving, Southwest, in preparing its bid to 
MVC, planned on utilizing a ribbon style method of paving and based its bid on the 
premise that ribbon paving would be allowed for the entire 1-215 Project. (R. 515-516; 
R. 1421: 15; R. 1497). 
7. Ribbon paving is the most common form of paving used in highway and 
interstate construction improvement projects and is the most cost effective method of 
paving because it results in the fewest amount of stops, downtime, and resets of the 
paving equipment and asphalt plant. (R. 517; R. 1421: 10; R. 1424: 776-777; R. 1497). 
8. Ribbon paving also results in higher productivity of the paving 
equipment, paving crew, truckers and asphalt plant than other methods of paving. (R. 
517; R. 1421: 10; R. 1498). 
9. In the vast majority of its highway and interstate construction 
improvement projects, UDOT has allowed the ribbon style paving method to be utilized. 
(R. 1424: 709, 805; R. 1499). 
10. UDOT allowed Staker & Parsons, another paving contractor, to utilize 
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the ribbon style paving method in a similar interstate project along the 1-15 interstate 
corridor near the Point of the Mountain in Salt Lake and Utah Counties, which took place 
during and after the 1-215 Project. (R. 517; 523-525; R. 1421: 77-87; R. 1422: 331-333; 
R. 1424: 796, 803-805, 810; R. 1499, Trial Ex. 20). 
11. The 1-15 Point of the Mountain Project included similar specifications as 
were used in the 1-215 Project where ribbon paving was not allowed. (R. 1421: 87; R. 
1424: 803-804; R. 1499). 
C. Pre-Pave Meetings re: UDOT Restrictions on Method of Paving and Notice 
by MVC/Southwest of Impacts Due to Restrictions 
12. The paving portion of the 1-215 Project began in late June or early July 
2003. (R. 1421: 49-50; R. 1422: 325; R. 1499). 
13. Prior to paving beginning, from the fall of 2002 to June 12, 2003, UDOT 
never notified MVC or Southwest that ribbon paving would not be allowed on portions of 
the 1-215 Project where there would be a greater than two inch vertical grade separation 
between traffic lanes. (R. 1422: 325-328; R. 1424: 777; R. 1500). 
14. On June 12, 2003, at a pre-pave meeting, Brandon Squire, UDOT's 
young and relatively inexperienced Project Engineer, notified MVC and Southwest 
personnel for the first time that MVC/Southwest would not be allowed to ribbon pave a 
significant portion of the 1-215 Project. (R. 1421: 51; R. 1422: 325-328, 364-366, 425-
428; R. 1424: 506; R. 1500-1501). 
15. In support of his position directing MVC/Southwest not to use the ribbon 
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paving method, Brandon Squire relied on his interpretation of the TC-2A Hazard 
Mitigation Flowchart ("TC-2A Flowchart"), which is a Standard Specification included 
in all UDOT highway and construction improvement projects. (R. 1421: 51; R. 1422: 
325-328, 358-359, 364-366, 427-428; R. 1424: 619-620, 695, 829, 847-848; R. 1500-
1501). 
16. Specifically, Brandon Squire represented to MVC/Southwest at the meeting 
that ribbon paving would not be allowed in areas of the 1-215 Project where it would 
result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation between traffic lanes because he 
claimed that the TC-2 A Flowchart did not allow for traffic to traverse a vertical grade 
separation greater than two inches. (R. 1421: 51; R. 1422: 325-328, 425-428; R. 1424: 
619-620; R. 1501). 
17. Southwest's Project Manager, David Olson, responded by informing 
Brandon Squire that Southwest had planned on ribbon paving the entire 1-215 Project and 
could mitigate the greater than two inch vertical grade separation by providing a 6:1 or 
flatter taper on the vertical edges between traffic edges, which was allowed by the TC-2A 
Flowchart and which practice had been used successfully by Southwest on all of its prior 
projects, including Southwest's prior projects with UDOT. (R. 1422: 328-329, 429; R. 
1499, 1501). 
18. Brandon Squire denied Southwest's request to use the ribbon paving 
method to pave the 1-215 Project using a 5:1 or flatter taper to mitigate the vertical grade 
separation. (R. 1422: 329, 429; 1424: 623-624, 701-702; R. 1501). 
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19. In response, David Olson told Brandon Squire that not allowing 
MVC/Southwest to ribbon pave the entire 1-215 Project would result in increased costs, 
production inefficiencies and scheduling problems. (R. 1422: 329, 341-342, 366; R. 
1502). 
20. Despite being notified of the increased costs, production inefficiencies 
and scheduling problems, Brandon Squire re-iterated his position that MVC/Southwest 
would not be able to ribbon pave where a greater than two inch vertical grade separation 
between traffic lanes would result. (R. 1422: 329-330, 341-342, 429; R. 1502). 
21. Thereafter, on July 31, 2003, at another pre-pave meeting, the issue of 
ribbon paving came up again between MVC, Southwest and UDOT. (R. 1422: 367, 429-
431; R. 1424: 778; R. 1502). 
22. Ken Schmidt, Southwest's Project Superintendent, was present at the 
meeting together with Brandon Squire and other Southwest employees. (R. 1422: 367-
368,429-431). 
23. Brandon Squire told Ken Schmidt, Tim Sisneros and Ben Lujan 
that ribbon paving would not be allowed where it would result in a greater than two inch 
vertical grade separation. (R. 1422: 368; R. 1424: 778; R. 1502). 
24. Ken Schmidt expressed to Brandon Squire the same concerns that had 
been raised by MVC/Southwest in the June 12, 2003, pre-pave meeting, including 
negative impacts on Southwest's production output and scheduling. (R. 1422: 368; R. 
1424: 778; R. 1503). 
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25. Brandon Squire responded by re-iterating his position that 
MVC/Southwest could not use ribbon paving where it would result in a greater than two 
inch vertical grade separation. (R. 1422: 368; R. 1424: 778; R. 1503). 
D. Commencement of Paving and Continued Notice from MVC/Southwest to 
UDOT of Impacts Due to Paving Restrictions 
26. From early August 2003 until the 1-215 Project was completed in late 
September 2003, Ken Schmidt, Tim Sisneros, Ben Lujan and Shawn Hammer (all 
Southwest employees) had several conversations at the project site with UDOT personnel 
(at least twice per week), including Brandon Squire and a UDOT Inspector, Ronnie Bair, 
where Southwest personnel told Brandon Squire and Ronnie Bair that not being allowed 
to ribbon pave was affecting Southwest's production output, costs, quality of product and 
scheduling of work. (R. 1422: 368-370, 383-388, 432-435, 461-462; R. 1503). 
27. Richard Jessop, MVC's Project Superintendent, witnessed some of these 
conversations. (R. 1424: 778-779; R. 1503). 
28. Brandon Squire and Ronnie Bair responded by directing the work to 
continue and directed MVC/Southwest to supply more work crews. (R. 1422: 369-370, 
379, 383-388, 461; R. 1503). 
29. As a result of UDOT's directive that ribbon style paving could not be 
used in areas in which there was a greater than two inch vertical grade separation, 
MVC/Southwest had to utilize block paving, which is significantly more expensive and 
time consuming than ribbon paving because it requires multiple start-ups and shut downs 
l l 
of the asphalt plant, multiple movements of paving equipment and downtime of the 
paving equipment, trucks and paving crews. (R. 517; R. 1421: 10, 96; R. 1498, 1504). 
30. UDOT's requirement that MVC/Southwest not utilize ribbon paving 
for a substantial portion of the 1-215 Project resulted in increased production costs, 
operating costs, increased wastage and down time for paving crews, trucks, paving 
equipment and the asphalt plant. (R. 1421: 96-150, 104-107; R. 1504; Trial Ex. 24). 
31. Throughout the 1-215 Project and at trial, UDOT never argued that its 
continuous directives to MVC/Southwest that ribbon paving not be used where it would 
result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation constituted an alteration in the 
contract. Rather, UDOT maintained throughout the 1-215 Project and at trial that the 
contract did not allow ribbon paving in areas where it would result in a greater than two 
inch vertical grade separation. (R. 1495-1526). 
32. Moreover, the contract only allowed UDOT to alter the 1-215 Project 
if it provided written notice of the alterations, which it failed to do. Specifically, the 
contract provides that the UDOT Engineer "reserves the right at any time during the work 
to make written changes in quantities and alterations in the work that are necessary to 
satisfactorily complete the project." (Trial Ex. 103 at 54). (Emphasis added). 
33. If the UDOT Engineer made any such alterations, UDOT agreed that it 
would pay for any increased costs due to the alterations. (Trial Ex. 103 at 54-56). 
E. Other UDOT Project Involving Same Paving Specifications Where Ribbon 
Paving Was Allowed by UDOT. 
34. On the 1-15 Point of the Mountain Project, described above, UDOT 
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allowed its paving contractor, Staker and Parsons, to pave the entire project in ribbon 
style, and allowed traffic to travel across lanes where there was a greater than two inch 
vertical grade separation. (R. 517, 523-525; R. 1421: 77-87; R. 1422: 331-333; 1424: 
796, 803-807, 810-811; R. 1499, 1506; Trial Ex. 20). 
35. The 1-15 Point of the Mountain Project Specifications included the same 
specifications UDOT and Brandon Squire relied on in the 1-215 Project for not allowing 
MVC/Southwest to ribbon pave, including the TC-2A Flowchart. (R. 1421:87; R. 1424: 
803-804; R. 1499,1506). 
36. The I-15 Point of the Mountain Project was discovered by 
MVC/Southwest immediately following a meeting on October 7, 2003 between UDOT 
and Southwest, where a UDOT representative told Mike Moehn of Southwest that the 
paving specifications, including the TC-2A Flowchart, were uniformly used, interpreted 
and applied on all UDOT highway and interstate projects in the same manner that they 
were being used, interpreted, and applied on the 1-215 Project. (R. 1422: 308-310; R. 
1424: 910; R. 1507). Brandon Squire was present at the meeting and did not say 
anything that would contradict this representation, which representation was consistent 
with similar prior statements made by Brandon Squire during the course of the 1-215 
Project. (R. 1421: 90, 1422: 340, 1507-1508). 
F. UDOT's Denial of MVC/Southwest9s Claim and Claims Prosecution and Tolling 
Agreement Between MVC and Southwest. 
37. On September 24, 2004, MVC/Southwest filed a Formal Claim against 
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UDOT for MVC/Southwest's increased costs and for unwarranted thickness penalties 
accessed by UDOT against MVC/Southwest. (R. 1421: 95; 1424: 514-515; Trial Ex. 25 
&26). 
38. UDOT's Claims Board of Review considered MVC/Southwest's claims 
on the merits and recommended they be denied, which UDOT did. (R. 1421: 146-147; 
1424: 514-516; Trial Ex. 29 & 112). 
39. MVC then brought suit against UDOT. Pursuant to a Claims Prosecution 
and Tolling Agreement entered into between MVC and Fisher Industries, Southwest's 
parent company, MVC assigned and granted Southwest the right to prosecute 
MVC/Southwest's claims in MVC's name since there was no direct contractual 
relationship between UDOT and Southwest. (R. 1182-1187; R. 1497). 
40. The claims are not only Southwest's claims, they are MVC's claims as 
well, as all work performed by Southwest on the 1-215 Project was part of MVC's 
scope of work under MVC's contract with UDOT. (Trial Ex. 6 & 103). (Emphasis 
added). 
41. The Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement reflects that the claims 
were MVC's claims as well as Southwest's in that MVC stated that it "hereby assigns 
and conveys to Fisher [Southwest] the right to prosecute, negotiate, settle, and otherwise 
pursue the Block Paving Claim against UDOT in the name of MVCI under the terms of 
the Prime Contract with UDOT." (R. 1183). 
42. MVC and Fisher [Southwest] agreed that "absent this Agreement, the 
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parties [MVC and Fisher] would further assert and prosecute the Block Paving Claim and 
the Other Claims against one another. . . " (R. 1183). 
43. As part of the Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement, Fisher 
[Southwest] agreed to seek the recovery of MVC s profit, overhead, bond markups and 
taxes as it related to the Block Paving Claim. (R. 1184). 
44. MVC and Fisher [Southwest] also agreed that Fisher would be entitled to 
deduct from MVC's recovery 15% of Fisher's claim preparation and prosecution costs, 
including travel, discovery, attorney's fees, fact, expert and consulting fees and litigation 
costs. (R. 1184). 
45. Fisher [Southwest] agreed to be bound to MVC to the same extent that 
MVC is shown to be bound to UDOT as it related to the claim for extra costs, which 
clearly shows this was MVC's claim. (R. 1184). 
46. Finally, the Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement specifically states 
that it was "intended to resolve all aspects of the Block Paving Claim as between Fisher 
[Southwest] and MVCI. . . In the event Fisher recovers any amounts or does not 
actually recover any amounts from UDOT on the Block Paving Claim . . . MVCI and 
Liberty [MVC's Surety] will have no liability to Fisher with respect to the Block Paving 
Claim." (R. 1184). 
G. Facts Relating to Thickness Deficiency Claim 
47. The total thickness of asphalt laid by MVC/Southwest on the TLA 
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(Trinidad Lake Asphalt) portion of the 1-215 Project was to be five inches thick. (R. 
1421:33). 
48. However, the contract specifications state that UDOT would accept a 
paving lot when "No individual sublot shows a deficient thickness of more than 3/8 of an 
inch." (Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). 
49. Paragraph 1.4(A) of the contract specifications state that "A lot equals the 
number of tons of HMA [hot mix asphalt] placed during each production day." (Trial 
Ex. 3 at 345; Trial Ex. 103 at 345). (Emphasis added). 
50. Paragraph 1.4(A) provides that a "sublot" makes up part of a "lot". (Trial 
Ex. 3 at 345; Trial Ex. 103 at 345). 
51. On the 1-215 Project, UDOT and MVC/Southwest agreed that the total 
five inches of asphalt to be laid would be performed in two separate lifts on separate 
days; the first a three inch lift and the second a two inch lift. (R. 1421: 
43-44; R. 1424: 639, 898; R. 1515). 
52. Therefore, a three inch lift performed within a day's production 
constituted a "lot" and the two inch lift performed on a different day constituted a 
separate second "lot." (R. 1421: 38-39, 43-44, 69, 71, 75; R. 1424: 926-927). 
53. Thickness and density were measured each day during the course of the 
1-215 Project and the same measurement cores were used to measure both thickness and 
density, as allowed for by the contract specifications. (R: 1421: 34, 36-37, 42; R. 1515; 
Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). 
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54. After a majority of the paving work had been completed by 
MVC/Southwest, UDOT informed MVC/Southwest for the first time that some areas of 
the asphalt were deficient in thickness. (R. 1421: 38, 64-65; R. 1422: 465-466). 
55. In coming to this conclusion, UDOT only allowed for a 3/8 of an inch 
deficiency on the total five inches of asphalt laid by MVC/Southwest instead of a 3/8 of 
an inch deficiency on each sublot as allowed for by the contract. (R. 1421: 43-44, 69, 
71, 75, 103;; R. 1425: 952-953; R. 1515; Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). 
56. UDOT specifically relied on paragraph 1.4(E)(3)(b) of the contract 
specifications in determining that MVC/Southwest was only entitled to a total of 3/8 of 
an inch deficiency in thickness on both sublots. (R. 1424: 882-883, 917-918, 923-924). 
57. UDOT assessed thickness deficiency penalties against MVC/Southwest 
in the amount of $166,416.00. (R. 1425: 953). 
58. On September 24, 2004, MVC/Southwest filed a Formal Claim against 
UDOT for unwarranted thickness penalties accessed by UDOT against MVC/Southwest, 
which claim was denied. (R. 1421: 95, 146-147; 1424: 514-515; Trial Ex. 25, 26, 29 and 
112). 
H. Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
59. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ruled that the 1-215 Project 
Specifications allowed for ribbon style paving for the entire project and that UDOT's 
directive that ribbon style paving not be used was not consistent with the contractual 
requirements. (R. 1518). 
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60. The trial court found that UDOT breached the contract because it failed 
to compensate MVC/Southwest for increased costs incurred as a result of UDOT's 
erroneous directive that ribbon paving not be used on portions of the 1-215 Project where 
it would result in a greater than two inch vertical separation grade. (R. 1519-1520). 
61. Specifically, the trial court found that UDOT's decision to prohibit 
ribbon paving where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical separation grade 
interfered with the method and means by which the asphalt paving should have been 
allowed to be performed by MVC/Southwest and constituted a material breach of the 
contract by UDOT. (R. 1519). 
62. The trial court also found that UDOT breached the contract by 
misinterpreting and misapplying the asphalt paving specifications and misrepresented the 
manner in which the asphalt paving specifications were interpreted, used and applied on 
other UDOT highway and interstate projects. (R. 1519). 
63. The trial court found that, as a result of the changes in paving methods 
made by UDOT, MVC/Southwest incurred substantial added costs for materials, labor, 
downtime, equipment, testing, grinding, trucking, traffic control, plant operations and 
other miscellaneous costs. (R. 1520). 
64. The trial court found that Brandon Squire was neither a knowledgeable, 
nor credible, witness on matters dealing with methods and means of asphalt paving, 
compaction, and contract interpretation issues relating thereto. (R. 1507). 
65. The trial court found that Lance Harris and Richard Jessop, both of 
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MVC, were not knowledgeable witnesses as it relates to paving issues, compaction 
issues, and contract interpretation issues pertaining to the placement of asphalt paving. 
R. 1508). 
66. The trial court found that Mike Moehn, Dave Olson, Tim Sisneros, Ken 
Schmidt, Ben Lujan and Shawn Hammer, all of Southwest, were the more credible 
witnesses and more knowledgeable in the area of paving and plant operations than 
Brandon Squire, Lance Harris and Richard Jessop. (R. 1508). 
67. The trial court found that as of June 12, 2003, UDOT was on notice that 
prohibiting MVC/Southwest from ribbon paving the entire 1-215 Project would result in 
increased costs, production inefficiencies, downtime, scheduling problems, and other 
impacts to MVC/Southwest. (R. 1422: 994-996; R. 1510, 1520). 
68. The trial court found that the legal principles Thorn Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365, 369-370 (Utah 1979), are 
applicable in this matter, i.e. where the project engineer orally furnishes a work directive 
to the contractor in the midst of construction for work not contemplated in the 
contractor's original bid, and where the project engineer is given notice of the adverse 
impacts of the directive in the form of the need for additional compensation, formal 
notice under the terms of the contract are not required because the project engineer is 
obviously on notice that extra compensation will be required. (R. 1521). 
69. The trial court found that, as in Thorn, because MVC/Southwest gave 
19 
oral notice to UDOT on several occasions of the adverse impacts of UDOT s directive 
that MVC/Southwest not ribbon pave portions of the 1-215 Project, and UDOT orally 
directed MVC/Southwest to proceed with the work and not use ribbon paving, 
MVC/Southwest was not required to give formal written notice as required by the 
contract. (R. 1521-1522). 
70. The trial court found that the trial testimony of Brandon Squire 
established that any formal written or further notice of adverse impacts to 
MVC/Southwest would not have changed his mind in not allowing ribbon paving in areas 
where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation. (R. 1510). 
71. The trial court additionally found that UDOT, by its conduct, impliedly 
waived strict compliance with the contractual notice provisions because it acted in a 
manner inconsistent with its contractual rights by orally responding to MVC/Southwest's 
complaints regarding paving methods and by dealing informally and directly with 
Southwest personnel on paving issues (i.e. verbally directing Southwest to continue block 
paving when notified of the impacts instead of requiring that a written claim be made). 
(R. 1511, 1522). 
72. The trial court further found that UDOT and MVC modified the contract 
as it relates to the contract's written notice provisions in that any written notice 
requirements were orally modified and waived when UDOT verbally directed 
MVC/Southwest to proceed with block paving despite MVC/Southwest's requests that 
they be allowed to ribbon pave. (R. 1513). 
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73. In so finding, the trial court found that the legal principles of R/T. 
Nielson Co. v. Coot 2002 UT 11113; 40 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Utah 2002), were applicable, 
i.e., UDOT and MVC/Southwest orally modified their written agreement as it relates to 
the written contract's notice provisions when UDOT verbally directed MVC/Southwest 
to proceed with the block paving in areas where it would result in a greater than two inch 
vertical grade separation despite being notified on several occasions that such would 
significantly and adversely impact MVC/Southwesf s costs, production and efficiency. 
(R. 1524). 
74. The trial court also found that UDOT waived and is estopped from 
asserting that MVC/Southwest should have strictly complied with contractual notice 
provisions because UDOT failed to follow the same asphalt paving specifications on both 
the 1-215 Project and the 1-15 Point of the Mountain Project and misrepresented to 
Southwest that the use and application of the 1-215 contract specifications by UDOT was 
uniform on other UDOT highway and interstate projects with similar specifications and 
requirements. (R. 1522-1523). 
75. The trial court found that, because UDOT reached and addressed the merits of 
MVC/Southwest's claim regarding paving methods and costs in the Claims Board of 
Review, UDOT waived and was estopped from asserting that MVC/Southwest must 
strictly comply with the contractual notice provisions. (R. 1524). 
76. In so finding the trial court found that the legal principles ofProcon 
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Corp. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 876 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) applied, 
i.e., that review of the merits of a claim arguably waives a party's obligation to comply 
with a contract's strict notice provisions. (R. 1523). 
77. The trial court found that MVC/Southwest's methods in determining its 
damages resulting from UDOT's directives that ribbon paving not be utilized on portions 
of the 1-215 Project were reliable, credible, accurate, and reasonable. (R. 1513). 
78. The trial court awarded damages to MVC in the amount of $548,832.52, 
which did not include interest. (R. 1516, 1525). 
79. As it relates to MVC/Southwest's claim for recovery of the $166,416.00 
in thickness penalties, the trial court found that the contract specifications relating to 
allowable thickness deviations were "less than clear." (R. 1515). (Emphasis added). 
80. However, the trial court adopted UDOT's interpretation of the 
allowable thickness deviation, finding that an allowable thickness deficiency of 3/8 of an 
inch applied to the total thickness of the asphalt pavement (five inches) and not to each 
individual lift (three inch lift and 2 inch lift). (R. 1515-1516). 
81. Accordingly, the trial court denied MVC/Southwest's thickness claim of 
$166,416.00. (R. 1525). 
82. The trial court found that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, MVC 
was entitled to 10% per annum interest on its awarded damages of $548,832.52 starting 
from 11/1/2004 (when MVC submitted its formal claim to UDOT's Claims Review 
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Board, approximately one year after the 1-215 Project was completed) to the date 
Judgment was entered, which was December 8, 2008. (R. 1516, 1525, 1528). 
83. Final Judgment in favor of MVC and against UDOT was entered on 
December 8, 2008, in the amount of $774,079.58 ($219,533.00 of which was interest). 
(R. 1528-1529). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS RELATED TO UDOT'S APPEAL 
The trial court correctly determined that UDOT breached its contract with MVC 
by not allowing MVC/Southwest to ribbon pave the majority of the 1-215 Project and 
refusing to pay for increased costs incurred by MVC/Southwest as a result of having to 
use a more expensive paving method. Contrary to UDOT's position otherwise, MVC is 
entitled to damages resulting from UDOT's directive that ribbon paving not be used. 
MVC was responsible for performing all paving operations on the 1-215 Project and the 
damages resulting from UDOT's directive that ribbon paving not be used were directly 
related to MVC's scope of work under its contract with UDOT. MVC was legally 
entitled to pursue the damages directly from UDOT. However, rather than pursuing the 
damages from UDOT, MVC passed the costs down through assignment to its paving 
subcontractor, Southwest. Southwest could have brought suit directly against MVC for 
the damages. If it had, MVC would then have sued UDOT in the same proceeding 
seeking those damages. Rather than taking that course of action, MVC and Southwest 
entered into a Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement, wherein MVC assigned and 
granted Southwest the right to prosecute the claim for extra costs in MVC's name. 
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Additionally, this Court should not even consider UDOT's position on this matter 
because UDOT failed to raise this argument below at trial and therefore it is waived. 
UDOT argues that it could not have breached the contract by interfering with 
MVC/Southwesf s paving means and methods because the contract permitted UDOT to 
do so. In reality, the trial court correctly determined that UDOT did breach the contract 
because of its interference and its failure to pay for increased costs resulting from 
UDOT's interference. While the contract may have allowed UDOT to alter the contract, 
the contract required that UDOT give MVC written notice of any such alteration, which it 
failed to do. The contract also obligated UDOT to pay for increased costs due to its 
alteration, which it failed to do. 
In addition, the Court should not even consider UDOT's alteration argument 
because UDOT never took the position at trial that it had altered the contract by 
prohibiting ribbon paving. Rather, UDOT's only position at trial was that the contract 
specifications prohibited MVC/Southwest from using ribbon paving. 
As to UDOT's argument that MVC/Southwest did not comply with the contract's 
strict written notice provisions relating to requests for additional compensation for extra 
work, the trial court correctly interpreted Thorn Construction Co. Inc. v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) and determined that 
MVC/Southwest was excused from strictly complying with said provisions because 
UDOT directed the extra work and MVC/Southwest provided UDOT with repeated 
verbal notice that not being allowed to ribbon pave would result in increased costs and 
24 
other negative impacts. UDOT acknowledged the multiple verbal notices and directed 
MVC/Southwest to proceed with work even though UDOT knew of the increased costs 
and negative impacts. 
Lastly, the trial court correctly found that UDOT modified, waived and is estopped 
from relying on the contract's strict written notice provisions due to UDOT's course of 
conduct before, during and after the subject project. First, UDOT impliedly waived any 
right to rely on the contract's written notice provisions because UDOT orally responded 
to MVC/Southwest's complaints regarding paving methods without requiring strict 
compliance with contractual notice provisions relating to compensation for extra work, 
and dealt informally and directly with Southwest personnel on paving method issues 
instead of dealing directly with MVC. This also resulted in a modification of the 
contract's notice provisions to excuse MVC/Southwest from the necessity of providing 
written notice to UDOT. 
Second, UDOT waived and is estopped from relying on the strict notice provisions 
of the contract because UDOT misrepresented to Southwest the correct use and 
application of the 1-215 Project Specifications. On other UDOT highway and interstate 
projects with similar specifications and requirements, paving contractors were allowed to 
utilize ribbon paving even where it resulted in a greater than two inch vertical separation 
grade. UDOT misrepresented this fact to MVC/Southwest. 
Third, UDOT waived and is estopped from relying on the strict written notice 
provisions because, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, UDOT's Claims Review Board 
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considered the merits of MVC/Southwest's claims and recommended they be denied. 
UDOTs Deputy Director adopted the recommendations of the Claims Review Board and 
denied MVC/Southwest's claims. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS RELATED TO MEADOW VALLEY'S 
CROSS-APPEAL 
First, the trial court incorrectly found that MVC/Southwest was only entitled to a 
3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on the total thickness of the asphalt installed by 
MVC/Southwest. The contract allows for a 3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on each 
lot installed. The Court did not apply this contract standard. It agreed with the UDOT 
assessment that applied the 3/8 of an inch deficiency to the two lots (total thickness) of 
asphalt laid by MVC/Southwest. The contract specifications relating to allowable 
thickness deviations in the asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest on the 1-215 Project are 
ambiguous and capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. MVC/Southwesf s 
interpretation that it was entitled to a 3/8 of an inch deficiency allowance on each of the 
two separate lots of asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest, for a total of 3/4 of an inch 
deficiency on the total asphalt thickness, is a reasonable interpretation of the contract 
specifications. 
Second, the trial court incorrectly determined that pre-judgment interest on 
MVC/Southwesf s damages did not begin to accrue until November 1, 2004, 
approximately one year after the 1-215 Project had been completed. Pre-judgment 
interest on the damages should have begun to accrue on November 11, 2003 because that 
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is the date that MVC/Southwest's damages had been determined with reasonable 
mathematical certainty. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that MVC Is Entitled to Damages 
Resulting From UDOT's Directive that Ribbon Paving Not be Used. 
a. The Damages Awarded by the Trail Court are MVC's Damages. 
Contrary to UDOT's claims otherwise, the trial court correctly determined 
that MVC is entitled to damages resulting from UDOT's directive that MVC/Southwest 
not ribbon pave the 1-215 Project where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical 
grade separation between traffic lanes. Pursuant to the contract between UDOT and 
MVC, MVC was responsible for performing all paving operations on the 1-215 Project, 
including furnishing all materials, labor and equipment necessary to perform the paving. 
(R. 1496; Trial Ex. 6 & 103 at 52). While MVC subcontracted the paving work to 
Southwest, MVC, as the general contractor, remained responsible to UDOT for the 
paving operations. (R. 1496-1497; Trial Ex. 6, 8, 9 and 103). Because MVC remained 
responsible to UDOT for the paving operations, MVC was entitled to make a claim for 
any extra costs incurred as a result of changes made to the work by UDOT. (Trial Ex. 
103 at 54, 56; Trial Ex. 9 at 5.4). 
In this case, as a result of UDOT's directive that MVC/Southwest not utilize 
ribbon paving on a large portion of the 1-215 Project, MVC/Southwest incurred 
significant cost increases. (R. 1421: 96-100, 104-107; R. 1504; Trial Ex. 24-26). MVC 
is contractually entitled to the increased costs because the costs include labor, materials 
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and equipment directly within MVC's scope of work under its contract with UDOT. (R. 
1496, Trial Ex. 6 & 103). 
Prior to this litigation, MVC pursued the extra costs from UDOT and UDOT 
rejected the same. (R. 1421: 146-147; R. 1424: 514-516; Trial Ex. 29 & 112). Instead of 
commencing litigation against UDOT to try and recapture the costs, which it was legally 
entitled to do, MVC passed, by assignment, the losses down to Southwest, who did not 
have a direct contractual relationship with UDOT and, therefore, could not sue UDOT 
directly. (R. 1424:521-522). Specifically, Lance Harris, MVCs Project Manager, 
testified at the trial as follows: 
Q. And as a matter of fact Meadow Valley reduced the cost of the price of the 
subcontract [with Southwest] by the amount it [MVC] was reduced in payment by 
UDOT; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Basically passed along the loss to Southwest? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 1424: 521-522). 
While Southwest initially absorbed the increased costs, MVC still had standing to 
bring a claim for the costs against UDOT because all Southwest had to do was file suit 
against MVC for the extra costs. MVC, in turn, would have had to sue UDOT in the 
same proceeding to recover the costs from UDOT or pay Southwest the increased costs 
directly. However, rather than Southwest suing MVC and MVC, in turn, suing UDOT, 
MVC and Southwest decided to enter into a Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement, 
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wherein MVC assigned and granted Southwest the right to prosecute the claim for extra 
costs in MVCs name. (R. 1182-1187; R. 1424: 533; R. 1497). 
A close reading of the Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement clearly reflects 
that the claim for extra costs was MVC's claim. Specifically, in the agreement, MVC 
stated that it "hereby assigns and conveys to Fisher [Southwest] the right to prosecute, 
negotiate, settle, and otherwise pursue the Block Paving Claim against UDOT in the 
name of MVCI under the terms of the Prime Contract with UDOT." (R. 1183). MVC 
and Southwest agreed that absent the agreement they "would further assert and 
prosecute the Block Paving Claim and Other Claims against one another. . . " (R. 
1183). (Emphasis added). This language clearly reflects that, absent the agreement, 
MVC and Southwest would have litigated the issue of extra costs between each other. 
Had that occurred MVC would have sued UDOT and asserted a claim for the extra costs. 
The agreement also states that it was "intended to resolve all aspects of the Block 
Paving Claim as between Fisher [Southwest] and MVCI in connection with the Project. 
In the event Fisher [Southwest] recovers any amounts or does not actually recover any 
amounts from UDOT on the Block Paving Claim after a disposition on the merits, MVCI 
and Liberty [MVC's Surety] will have no liability to Fisher [Southwest] with respect to 
the Block Paving Claim." (R. 1184). This provision clearly shows that the claim for 
extra costs belonged to MVC in that it acknowledges a dispute between MVC and UDOT 
relating to the extra costs suffered by MVC and passed down to Southwest. 
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It is clear that the trial court correctly awarded damages to MVC in this matter. 
The extra costs relate directly to MVC's scope of work under its contract with UDOT. 
While MVC passed the costs down to Southwest, the extra costs still belonged to MVC 
because had Southwest sued MVC directly, MVC would have asserted the same claim 
against UDOT for the costs. 
Conversely, if UDOT's theory on this point was adopted, it would have the effect 
of nullifying virtually all liquidating agreements entered into between general contractors 
and subcontractors, and prevent subcontractors from bringing actions on behalf of general 
contractors against owners. Instead, it would require subcontractors to rely upon general 
contractors to litigate claims against owners relating to damages affecting both general 
contractors and the subcontractors. This would affect subcontractor prices, increase risk 
and would result in greater construction costs to all involved in a construction project, 
including owners, general contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors and, in cases of 
public projects, the taxpayer. 
b. The Court Should Not Even Consider UDOT's Assignment Argument 
Because it Was Not Raised at Trial. 
By UDOT's own admission, this issue was never raised at trial by UDOT. 
Pursuant to Utah law, "a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is 
barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 
1994). The trial court is considered "the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful 
and probing analysis" of issues and "failing to argue an issue and present pertinent 
evidence in that forum denies the trial court the opportunity to make any findings of fact 
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or conclusions of law pertinent to the claimed error." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 3585 360 
(UtahCt. App. 1993). 
The exception to this rule is that an appellate court may address an issue not raised 
at trial if the trial court committed plain error or there are exceptional circumstances. 
State V. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In order to establish plain error, an 
appellant must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'' Id. at 8. An exceptional circumstance exists 
only in truly unusual cases involving rare procedural anomalies. Id. at 11. Utah courts 
very rarely find either plain error or exceptional circumstances and, in fact, have stated 
that even issues involving liberty or constitutional rights do not necessarily constitute 
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 9; See also, State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 
(UtahCt. App. 1991). 
Clearly, the trial court did not commit plain error as it relates to the issue of 
whether MVC incurred damages and there are no exceptional circumstances that exist for 
even considering this issue for the first time on appeal. Rather, for the reasons set forth 
in Subsection a. above, the trial court correctly determined that MVC was entitled to 
damages. 
In addition, if UDOT felt that the trial court awarding damages to MVC was so 
clearly and plainly in error, it should have raised the issue with the trial court, which it 
failed to do. The trial court was the proper forum for this issue and the trial court could 
have handled the matter expeditiously and effectively. 
31 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That UDOT Breached the Contract 
by Interfering With and Changing MVC/Southwest's Means and Methods of 
Performing the Paving Work and Failing to Pay for Extra Costs Resulting 
From UDOT's Interference. 
In Point II of its Argument section, UDOT claims that MVC's breach of contract 
action fails as a matter of law, arguing that UDOT could not have breached the contract 
by altering the 1-215 Project because the contract allowed UDOT to alter the 1-215 
Project. UDOT's argument is flawed for several reasons, including: (1) UDOT did not 
raise this issue during trial and, therefore, it is waived. Specifically, UDOT did not view 
its directives as an alteration of the contract and never took the position at trial that it was 
an alteration. Rather, UDOT's only position at trial was that it was correctly interpreting 
the 1-215 Project Specifications when it gave the directive to MVC/Southwest on several 
occasions that they could not ribbon pave; (2) Even if UDOT considered the directive an 
alteration, it did not comply with contractual notice and payment requirements relating to 
changes/alterations in the work; and (3) Even if the contract permits UDOT to alter the I-
215 Project, it was legally obligated to pay for increased costs resulting from the 
alteration, which it failed to do. 
a. UDOT's Argument that it Could Not Have Breached the Contract by 
Altering the Project Because the Contract Provides that UDOT Can 
Alter the Project Was Not Raised at Trial. 
As already stated above, "a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial 
court is barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. In 
order to preserve an issue for appeal, "Utah courts require specific objections in order to 
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to 
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correct the errors if appropriate." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361. Also, for an issue to 
be sufficiently raised, "it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial judge can consider it." Id. 
In the instant case, UDOT never raised the issue at trial that it could not have 
breached the contract by altering the 1-215 Project because the contract allowed it to do 
so. Rather, UDOT's only position at trial was that it was correctly interpreting the 1-215 
Project Specifications when it directed MVC/Southwest to not ribbon pave in areas where 
it would result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation. (R. 1421: 51; R. 
1422: 325-328, 425-428; R; 1424: 619-620; R. 1501). UDOT simply never viewed its 
directives as an alteration of the contract and is only making this argument now in an 
attempt to confuse the issues and to draw the Court's attention away from the trial court's 
conclusions relating to UDOT's wrongful interpretation of their own contract 
specifications and MVC/Southwest's damages resulting from such. 
In support of its position that it raised the issue at trial, UDOT cites to pages 1274-
1277 of the Record. These pages make up a portion of UDOT's Trial Brief. In 
reviewing the pages, UDOT never takes the position or raises the issue that UDOT could 
not have breached the contract by altering the 1-215 Project because the contract provides 
that UDOT can alter the same. (R. 1274-1277). Rather, the only issues raised by UDOT 
relate to UDOT's position that MVC waived all claims because it did not comply with 
the notice and dispute resolution requirements of the contract and that UDOT was 
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correctly interpreting the contract, not altering or changing the contract, when it 
prohibited MVC/Southwest from ribbon paving. (R. 1274-1277). 
In sum, UDOT never raised the issue that it could not have breached by contract 
by altering the 1-215 Project because the contract permitted UDOT to do so. UDOT's 
position has always been that there was no alteration. Accordingly, this issue has been 
waived and the Court should not even consider the same. 
b. UDOT Did Not Comply With Contractual Notice and Payment 
Requirements Relating to Alterations in the Work. 
Even if UDOT now considers its directive prohibiting MVC/Southwest from 
ribbon paving to be an alteration of the 1-215 Project, UDOT failed to comply with its 
own contractual notice and payment requirements relating to alterations in the work. 
While the contract does give UDOT's project engineer the right to make 
changes/alterations in the work, the contract specifically provides that any such 
changes/alterations be made in writing. Specifically, the contract provides: "The 
Engineer reserves the right at any time during the work to make written changes in 
quantities and alteration in the work that are necessary to satisfactorily complete the 
project." (Trial Ex. 103 at 54) (Emphasis added). In addition, if the engineer makes 
changes or alterations in the work, UDOT is required to pay for extra costs associated 
with the changes/alterations. Specifically the contract provides: "Department [UDOT] 
adjusts the Contract, excluding anticipated profits, if the alterations or changes in 
quantities significantly change the character of the work under the contract." (Trial Ex. 
103 at 54). 
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In this case, prior to the paving work beir^. performed by MVC/Southwest, UDOT 
never made any written changes to the contract relating to its multiple direciix c- u 
]\ "1 \ 7 C/Southwest that ribbon paving was not to rv n,,r. , .:-.
 :: resi . i i j j w. agreater 
forth more fully above, UDO'I never considered its directives relating to paving methods 
a change/alteration to the contract i: r. . u u K \\oi-w na. c is^ucc a Wn!ic:i change order 
i >- - • : " <j>>>. / . v ; " : ; I : I M , I I :;*:*' ! % " * ;• ^ k u - ' V ' * ; : k / *: -^ •: • J I . : ; , L . : ' . • •. 
contract. 
Moreover, even if U D O T had made written changes as it relates to paving 
i i l d i h k L In l x n t l l i , u l oii (Ih* I ! 1"^  l'"f\i|L\'i, U l ) ( M \\ii> 111) k ;S |Hi fb i l i l i i\i \\\\ for 
MVC/Southwest for extra costs associated with changes/alterations, which it clearly did 
not do. 
*• UDOT is Required In l\i) lor Increased ( osts Resulting From • 
rations. 
As set forth above, even if UDOT had the ability to alter/change the 1-215 Project, 
it was still responsible for paying extra costs associated with the alterations/changes, 
w 1 licl i it failed, to dc ( I rial Ex 103 at 54) \ /hen the trial coi n fs conch isions ar e t ead in 
their entirety, it is clear that the trial court ruled that UDOT breached the contract because 
UDOT interfered with and changed the means and methods by which MVC/Southwest 
shoi lid have beei l allowed to pa\ e tl le subject project and f ailed to pay for extra costs 
associated with the interference and change. 
Specifically, the trial court found that: 
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9. UDOT breached its contract with Meadow Valley in directing 
Meadow Valley/Southwest not to use the ribbon style method on portions 
of the Project. 
10. UDOT breached its contract with Meadow Valley in misinterpreting 
and misapplying the asphalt paving specifications. 
12. UDOT was aware, and it was foreseeable to UDOT, that UDOT's 
decision to disallow ribbon paving throughout the Project would prejudice 
Meadow Valley/Southwest by resulting in substantial additional costs for 
materials, labor, downtime, equipment, testing, grinding, trucking, traffic 
control, plant operations, and other miscellaneous costs to Meadow 
Valley/Southwest. 
13. UDOT's breach of the contract resulted in substantial added costs 
for materials, labor, downtime, equipment, testing, grinding, trucking, 
traffic control, plan operations, and other miscellaneous costs to Meadow 
Valley/Southwest. 
(R. 1519-1520). 
When reading these conclusions in their true context, it is clear that the trial court 
ruled that UDOT breached the contract not only because UDOT interfered with 
MVC/Southwest's means and methods, but also because UDOT failed to pay for extra 
costs resulting from UDOT's interference. Had the trial court concluded that UDOT was 
entitled to change the 1-215 Project, UDOT still would have been in breach of contract 
because it did not pay for extra costs incurred by MVC/Southwest resulting from 
UDOT's changes as UDOT was clearly required to do under the contract. (Trial Ex. 103 
at 54). 
If the Court were to accept UDOT's logic that UDOT could not breach the 
contract because the contract allows UDOT to alter/change the Project, then UDOT 
would be able to make changes/alterations in its all of its projects (involving the same 
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coi iti act language I JDO I cites) ai id be i n idei i 10 obligatioi i to pay for an}7 ii lcreased costs 
due to the changes/alterations. This, of course, would be an absurd result. 
ITI. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That MVC/Southwest Was Excused 
From Strictly Complying With the Contract's Written Notice Provisions 
Because UDOT Directed MVC/Southwest to Not Ribbon Pave and UDOT 
Was Given Repeated Verbal Notice That Not Being Allowed to Ribbon Pave 
Would Have a Significant Impact on Costs, Production And Operating 
Schedules. 
•u inai court correctly determined that Ni \ \ Southwest?s numerous verba! 
i lotices to I JDOl in fori i ling I JDOT that prohibiting I\ 1 VC/Soi ithwest from i ising the 
ribbon paving method would result in increased costs, production inefficiencies, 
downtime, scheduling problems and other negative impacts to MVC/Southwest, 
constiti ited siifficieiit notice, thereby excusing M VC/Soi ithw e st from complying with the 
strict notice provisions of the contract. 
This Court has conclusively held that if a par;-- entitled in recen e notice of.: 
change v\a- area^: a^a;^. \K - v.- ,. . •„ :U.VM aw:i;v -.» *iv: Uiange. •::... :;;j:a :.-. ia) 
need to comply with strict written notice provisions of a contract. Specifically, in Thorn 
Construction Co. Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979), 
the plain;;]! con>.:a.wion company claimed n was emiiieu lo aaaiuoual compensation ior 
extra work performed at the reqi lest of 1 1 DOTas project ei lgineer I d. at 367. I JDOT 
argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to additional compensation because it had noi 
submitted a written request for payment as required ; >\ tne contract, and UK. W a,, ad its 
clain l as a result I d ' ' ' • 
:n support of its argument, UDOT cited the following contract provision: 
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If, in any case, where the contractor deems that additional compensation is 
due him for work or material not clearly covered in the contract or not 
ordered by the engineer as extra work as defined herein, the contractor 
shall notify the engineer in writing of his intention to make a claim for 
such additional compensation before he begins the work on which he 
bases the claim. 
Id. at 369. (Emphasis added). 
Despite the fact that the contract contained a strict notice provision that required 
the contractor to provide written notice of its claim and refrain from commencing work 
until providing written notice, this Court unanimously held that no written notice was 
required because UDOT's project engineer, not the contractor, orally directed the extra 
work to be performed and, therefore, UDOT clearly had actual notice that additional 
compensation would be required. Id. at 370. (Emphasis added). 
In addition to Thorn, courts outside of Utah have held that strict compliance with 
contractual notice provisions is unnecessary when the owner has actual notice. See, New 
Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 696 P.2d 185, 191 (Ariz. 1985) (where the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated that "Barring claims for compensation by a strict 
application of notice requirements is disapproved . . . where the government is 
aware of the changed conditions and of the claim for compensation and where no 
prejudice is shown by the lack of formal notice.") (Emphasis added). See also, Chaney 
Bids. Co., Inc. v. Sunnyside School District No. 12, 709 P.2d 904, 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1985) (where the Arizona Court of Appeals stated that "the evidence was sufficient for 
the trier of fact to infer that Sunnyside had actual notice of the delays . . . thereby 
making a 7-day written notice duplicitous and unnecessary . . . " ) . (Emphasis added). See 
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also, Roger J. At. A: Sons., Inc. v. Northeastj >M* RVLJKHMJ Scwcr District, 5 ^ v * V 
1209, :2 ! I (Ohio Ci. App. 1986) (where the Ohio Cour; of Appeals found lha; when an 
owner has constructive notice of a claim, the failure to provide written notice or 
otherwise strict.]) comph wit! 1 contract! lal notice pro\ isioi is is harmless). (Emphasis 
added). See also, Nelson Bros. Constr. Co. (1977), 77-2 BCA, ^ 12660, which states as 
follows: 
i aiiure to give formal notice of changes claims did not bar the claims 
because responsible officials were aware of the facts giving rise to the 
claims. A defense based upon lack of notice does not apply if such 
officials as a project inspector, COR, or project engineer had actual 
knowledge of the circumstances upon which the claim is based, nor is 
notice required for extra expenses that result from a work order. Such 
circumstances give actual knowledge of the basis for the claim and no 
prejudice results from a failure to receive notice. 
(Emphasis added). 
.v. ;m > case, consistent wuii Thorn anu UK other cases cited above. 
because UDOT clearly had actual notice of MVC/Southwest's claim for extra costs 
resulting from UDOT's directive that ribbon paving not be used. 
Specifically. as set forlh in IMO'V detail «iho\c in the "lacl!-"' section. I 'IX »i was 
informed by MVC/Southwest on several occasions before and during paving operations 
that UDOT's prohibition on ribbon paving would result in increased costs, production 
inefficiencies, schedi ilii ig pi oblei :t is and oil ler negati » • e ii i lpacts to I'V 1 VC/ Southwest. For 
example, UDOT was notified of such: 
• \t i i - June 12, 2003 pre-pave meeting. (R. 1422: 329, 341-342, 366; R. 1502). 
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• At the July 31, 2003 pre-pave meeting. (R. 1422: 367-368, 429-431; R. 1424: 778; R. 
1502-1503). 
• During several conversations in the field from early August 2003 until the end of the I-
215 Project that occurred at least twice per week. (R. 1422: 368-370, 383-388, 432-435, 
461-462; R. 1503). 
Despite being notified of the increased costs and other negative impacts, UDOT 
repeatedly re-iterated its position that MVC/Southwest could not ribbon pave in areas 
where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical separation grade and directed 
MVC/Southwest to continue work and not ribbon pave in those areas. (R. 1422: 329-
330, 341-342, 368-370, 379, 383-388, 429, 461; R. 1424: 778; R. 1502-1503). 
The trial court correctly determined that, consistent with Thorn, while 
MVC/Southwest did not strictly comply with the written contractual notice provisions, 
UDOT clearly had actual repeated verbal notice of MVC/Southwest's claim of 
increased costs due to not being allowed to ribbon pave, which notice was sufficient. (R. 
1510-1511, 1520-1522). Despite MVC/Southwest's ongoing complaints regarding 
production and scheduling issues, UDOT orally directed MVC/Southwest to proceed 
and perform extra work not contemplated by MVC/Southwest by restricting the manner 
and method of paving methods available to MVC/Southwest, which restriction required 
MVC/Southwest to utilize a method of paving that was more expensive and less efficient. 
(R. 1521). 
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UDOT cannot claim it was prejudiced by not receiving formal notice when the 
evidence clearly shows that it knew of MVC/Southwest's increased production costs and 
operating issues ; :.- J!u\:,,; - \ . v>i;tn.\e>: i<- pi ^v., .*.; \ : u won, „r; -A;/-., 
Moreo\ 01. nv.\ ; ,^ -inal written or further notice of adverse impacts to MVC/Southwest 
would .uv nave changed Brandon Squire's mind in not allowing ribbon paving in areas 
where it would result in a greater than two inch \ ertical grade separation. Brandon 
Sqi iii e""s position thi oughoi it trial \vas that the contract did nc >t allow for ribbon pa.1 'ing in 
those areas. (R. : 424: 619-620: R !:"!'.*: 
As to IJDOT's claim that VIYC agreed w it li I l.h )i\ -o iiion on paving methods 
. l l l oVu ' t f n i l f r " • •: ' x • ' *• "' " f i >-::\\\*u'' *
 ( - L ' " V • 4> ' - : - 01 1. 
Rather, Lance Harris, an MVC employee, who admitted he is not a. paving expert and 
whom the trial court found was not a knowledgeable witness as it relates to paving issues 
UDOTTs position on which paving methods were and were not allowed, but was just 
trying to pass on I JDOTs position to Southwest. (R 1424: 559. 578: 1508. Trial Ex. 16 
al l ) I vf\ 7"C never agreeo \\u:< v : * ' i " . po.^.ho:;. -r\. ; -.:15). 
As to case law cited by UDOT regarding written notice, UDOT cites one Utah 
case, Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (uiah 1998). for the proposition that where a 
contract requires written notice, strict compliance with the notice provision is required in 
• * r . -v - • :>* .:•'• . • . " . • • .: - - >"':'-*r:r>y i]i)\\-'-:_•>- C : c l > d rr c ; / > " " ' ' : • * . ; - - • » • : o p . y 
to the facts of this case as that case involved an option contract, not a bilateral contract. 
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This Court's holding in Geisdorf is clearly limited to situations where an option contract 
requires written notice to exercise an option. Id. at 71. 
Although UDOT does not specifically ask this Court to reverse Thorn, it is 
essentially asking the Court to do so. While the facts of Thorn and the instant case are 
not identical (they are close, however), the basic legal principle that this Court set forth in 
Thorn is that where a contract requires written notice for claims for additional 
compensation for work not covered in the contract, no written notice is required where 
the project engineer orally directs extra work to be performed because the project 
engineer clearly already has actual notice that additional compensation will be required. 
See, Thorn, 598 P.2d at 370. In the instant case, as set forth above in more detail, 
Brandon Squire orally directed MVC/Southwest to perform extra work not contemplated 
by MVC/Southwest by restricting the manner and method of paving methods allowed for 
under the contract, which restriction required MVC/Southwest to utilize a method of 
paving that was more expensive and less efficient. (R. 1521). Brandon Squire and other 
UDOT representatives were orally informed on several occasions of the adverse impacts 
to MVC/Southwest, including increased costs, production inefficiencies and scheduling 
problems, as a result of UDOT's directive, but UDOT, on several occasions, directed 
MVC/Southwest to proceed with the work anyway. (R. 1422: 329-330, 341-342, 366, 
368-370, 379, 383-388, 429, 432-435, 461-462; R. 1424: 778). 
The legal principles of Thorn clearly apply to the facts of this case and this Court 
should uphold those legal principles and find that MVC/Southwesf s numerous verbal 
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notices to UDOT relating to increased costs and other impacts due to UDOTs directive 
\\M iih'^-n paving nM be utilized in certain areas constituted sufficient notice, thereby 
excusing M VC/Southwest froi i 1 complying w Itli. the strict i lotice provisioi ts of the 
contract. 
Fhe Trial Court Correctly Determined that UDOT Modified, Waived and is 
Estopped From Relying on the Contract's Written Notice Provisions. 
The trial ecu irt con ectl> determined that I JDO I n lodified, wai\ ed and is estopped 
from relying on the strict written notice provisions of the contract due to UDOTs course 
of conduct before, during and after the subject project. 
* IK aiver of Reliance on * r , , ^ , 4 m ;t Provisions. 
Pursuant lo Utah iaw, "Waiver is an inicnuoiidi rehnquishmeni ol a known right. 
It must be distinctly made, although it may be expressed or implied." Interwest 
Construction v. Palmer et al., M^ • ..--.J ,._. ^l ; UIJL •.;. <\pr. :'^ Vw. ^ee also, Soter s, 
It ic. v. Deseret Federal Savings &. man /v^oi..*:""* *;?-: Li•->Z < > "i•J -• *': 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Kingston, 2005 I T App 233 ••I 'M -- i-4 P.3d 1158. i ,o! (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005) ("intent to relinquish a right need not. he express and may be implied from 
action or ii lactioi f) "Waiver of a eoiiti acti lal right occi irs w 1 lei i a party to a coi ltract 
intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent with contractual rights, and, as a result, 
prejudice accrues to the opposing party or parties to the contract." Interwest Construction 
•. ('aimer ct a... *v ' :. - • , " < - • 
preponderance of the evidence." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 
857P.2dat.942. 
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In this case, the trial court concluded that UDOT impliedly waived any right to 
rely on the contract's written notice provisions for several reasons. First, the trial court 
correctly found that UDOT impliedly waived strict compliance with the contractual 
notice provisions because UDOT acted in a manner inconsistent with its contractual 
rights by orally responding to MVC/Southwest's complaints regarding paving methods 
and by dealing informally and directly with Southwest personnel on paving method 
issues instead of dealing directly with MVC. (R. 1502-1503, 1511-1512). Rather than 
handling paving disputes directly with MVC, which would have been proper given 
UDOT's direct contractual relationship with MVC, UDOT handled paving disputes 
directly with Southwest personnel, including Dave Olsen, Ken Schmidt, Tim Sisneros, 
Ben Lujan and Shawn Hammer and directed Southwest personnel to proceed with block 
paving in areas where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation 
even though UDOT was aware that such direction would result in cost increases and 
negative impacts. (R. 1422: 329-330, 341-342, 366, 368-370, 379, 383-388, 429, 432-
435, 461-462; R. 1424: 778; R. 1502-1503, 1511-1512). 
Contrary to UDOT's assertions otherwise, beginning on June 12, 2003, and 
continuing throughout the 1-215 Project, there was clearly a dispute as to what methods 
of paving the contract allowed for and, by dealing directly with Southwest personnel on 
this dispute and verbally directing Southwest to block pave instead of ribbon pave, 
UDOT created an informal non-threatening atmosphere where it attempted to informally 
resolve paving disputes directly with Southwest without requiring strict compliance with 
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contractual notice provisions relating to extra compensation for altered work {i.e., 
verbally directing Southwest to proceed with work as directed when notified of impacts 
i :.,LC\K'. ^i requiring that IV! VC/Southw est 11 lake a w i ittei i claii t 1 for I ) DO I to coi isider). 
VR. 1422: 329-330, 341-342, 366, 368-370, 379, 383-388, 429, 432-435, 461-462; R. 
1424: 778; R. 1502-! 503. 1 f; : -; ?! 2,. P>> verbally denying MVC/Southwesf s request to 
riphon pave through .,r i:ie . „ . :• /;v . . : w anout requiring M v >outhwest to submit a 
believe that UDOT had waived strict compliance with the contractual notice provisions. 
Providing written notice n; that situation would have been pointless as ; "I )u i already 
1422: 325-330, 341-342; 364-366. 368. 425-428; R. 1424: 50b, O19-620, 623-624, 778;. 
Second, the trial court correctly found that UDOT waived and is estopped from. 
relying oi i the sti let it lotice provisioi is of tl ic contract because I J DO I misrepresented to 
Southwest the correct use and application of the 1-215 Project Specifications, including 
the TC-2A Hazard Mitigation Flowchart, on other UDOT highway and interstate projects 
with similar specifications and requirement . .\/nii: -;u i -.; " /rojecu rsiauuo;. ^a i re 
represented to MVC/Southwest that ribbon paving was nui ahowed in areas of the 1-2 i5 
Project where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation between 
;ra;ik ames, claiming inai ;:K .* „ : ;.*\wnur: ,.\L ^U..;;< — -•: ^rank to traverse a 
366, 368, 425-428: R. 1424: 506, <?l*>-o2U. 7~8j. in addition, at a meeting that occurred 
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on October 7, 2003, a representative of UDOT told Southwest that the TC-2A Flowchart 
was uniformly used, interpreted, and applied on all UDOT highway and interstate 
projects in the same manner that it was being used, interpreted, and applied on the 1-215 
Project (i.e., no ribbon paving where it would result in a greater than two inch vertical 
grade separation. (R. 1422: 308-310; R. 1424: 910; 1507-1508). Brandon Squire was 
present at the meeting and did not say anything that contradicted the representation, 
which representation was consistent with Brandon Squire's position during the course of 
the 1-215 Project as it relates to his interpretation of the 1-215 Project Specifications. (R. 
1421: 51, 90; R. 1422: 325-328, 340, 364-366, 368, 425-428; R. 1424: 619-620, 778; R. 
1501-1503, 1507-1508). 
The trial court concluded that UDOT's statements that ribbon paving was not 
allowed were misrepresentations because the evidence clearly reflected that UDOT had 
allowed other paving contractors on other highway and interstate projects to utilize 
ribbon paving even though it resulted in a greater than two inch vertical grade separation 
between traffic lanes. (R. 1523). Specifically, UDOT allowed Staker & Parsons to 
utilize ribbon paving on a project along the 1-15 interstate corridor near the Point of the 
Mountain in Salt Lake and Utah Counties occurring around the same time as the 1-215 
Project even though doing so resulted in a much greater than two inch vertical separation 
grade, which traffic was allowed to traverse. (R. 517, 523-525; R. 1421: 77-87; R. 1422: 
331-333; R. 1424: 796, 803-805, 810; R. 1499, 1506; Trial Ex. 20). The Point of the 
Mountain project included the same specifications UDOT relied on in the 1-215 Project 
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for not allowing ribbon paving, including the TC-2A Hazard Mitigatior ! ;<.^ J - v -• L 
the 3.5 Surface Placement provision, (R -421: 8~: R. 14 24: 803-804: R 1 4 ^ . :5^> 
Representatives o* M?i:i!U\e^ ciscovered iiie / o n : oi / A Mountain project riL.ni 
after the\ left, the October 7. 2003 meeting Soi ithwest obsei \ eel that ( IDO I ' w as 
allowing ribbon paving on that proieel e\ en though it resulted in a much greater than two 
inch vertical grade separation, which 14XF i <ii !*•-•.% cu Ira ; i JC to traverse. (R 517. 523-
525; R 1421: 77-87; R 1422:: 3314333; R 14 24: 796: 807-811; R 1499: I rial Ex. 20). 
UDOT's misrepresentation at the meeting on October 7, 2003, occurred at the same time 
ITDOT was allowing Staker and Parsons to use ribbon paving even though it resulted in a 
misrepresentation regarding a presently existing material fact made by UDOT to 
MVC/Southwest, resulting in UDOT's waiver of reliance on the written contractual 
notice pro\ isioi is 
Third, the trial court correctly concluded that by considering tin merits of 
MVC/Southwest's claims and deciding those claims on their merits, UDOl waived and 
is estopped m>m claiming that IV1 V"C/ Southwes t failed to comply - H . I ; ;U noiice 
provisions. See, Chaney Bldg. Co... Inc. \ Sunnyside School. Dist. No. 12, 709 I } 2d 904, 
007 (\v\z. Ci. App 10P5* (where live court held that because the defendant had reviewed 
the merits of me Piainm; .> CKIUI:. eelendant waived ;;ie r,uii u- acn\ the claim solely on 
-
1
 ' .*--* .;.- ^
 A-'v -, ...': ...T .. t{, ,_ p ... . %:. See ai^,. rr*k'v:: e ^r; . -r. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 876 P.2d 890, 893 , n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994; (where 
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the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "UDOT's review of the possible merits of Procon's 
claim arguably waived Procon's obligation to conform to the Contract's strict notice 
procedures.") 
In the instant case, UDOT's Claims Review Board reviewed MVC/Southwest's 
claims on the merits. (R. 1421: 146-147; R. 1424: 744-748; Trial Ex. 29). Specifically, 
UDOT reviewed and recommended that MVC/Southwest's claims for increased paving 
costs, thickness reduction penalties and traffic costs be denied. (R. 1421: 146-147; R. 
1424: 745-746, 748; Trial Ex. 29). UDOT's Claims Review Board did not recommend 
dismissal of MVC/Southwest's claims based on the failure to strictly comply with the 
contract's written notice provisions. (R. 1424: 744, 748; Trial Ex. 29 ). Carlos Braceras, 
UDOT's Deputy Director, then adopted the recommendations of UDOT's Claims Review 
Board and denied MVC/Southwest's claims on the merits. (R. 153; R. 1424: 746-747, 
749; Trial Ex. 112). 
Consistent with Chaney Bldg. Co., Inc. and dicta in Procon Corp. v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, because UDOT addressed the merits of 
MVC/Southwest's claims, UDOT waived and is estopped from asserting that 
MVC/Southwest must strictly comply with the contractual notice provisions. 
UDOT's argument that UDOT's Claims Review Board's recommendation to deny 
MVC/Southwest's claims was not an act of UDOT is erroneous. Special Provision 00727 
§ 1.25(B) identifies the Claims Review Board as a "Department Claims Board of 
Review." (Trial Ex. 103 at 78). "Department" is defined in the contract as "The Utah 
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Department of Transportation." (Trial Ex. 103 at 45). Cleany UDOT's Claims Board of 
Review is a IJDOT enlit>. Ewn if ii is noi a UDOT entity, I JDOTs Deputy Director, 
Carlos Braceras, adopted the recommendations o! i [>• ' •. • iunv^ KL^ iew L>oard, 
:n,i;soir;j"]\ na. * • !* :. UDO'i a, ' ; ~ M - '' ). 
Lastly, UDOT's argument that its review of the merits could not have waived its 
ability to re!} on the strict notice provisions because tl le trial court reviewed this matter 
prevent the trial court from determining that UDOT's review of the merits of 
MVC/Southwesf s claim waived LIDOT's ability to rely on the strict notice requirements 
ii; i du Tense. While llic irisil i uml n,iis imi h mud u» full ilnii \wi>s <i w a i \ er ha^ed on 
UDOT's review of the merits, it was well within its authority to find there was a waiver 
based on the evidence, which it did. 
b. J D O T and MVC/Southwest Modified and "V\ ai\ ed llic \ 'ontract's 
Notice Provisions. 
The trial court correctly concluded that UDOT and MVC/Southwest orally 
modified and waived the contract's written notice provisions, thereby excusing 
MVC/Southwest from strictly comply ii ig v • il 1 11 1 \c : < zi m t r ; K t""s: w i il t ei \ i u >tice pro\ isioi ) s Ii l 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11^13, n. 4; 40 V.jd i i r>. iI24 (Utah 2002), this 
Court stated as follows: 
In Utah, parties to a written agreement may not only enter into separate, 
subsequent agreements, but they may also modify a written agreement 
through verbal negotiations subsequent to entering into the initial written 
agreement, even if the agreement being modified unambiguously indicates 
thai any modifications must be in writing. 
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In the instant case, by verbally directing MVC/Southwest on several occasions (as 
more fully described above) to not ribbon pave and proceed with work as directed in 
areas where there was a greater than two inch vertical grade separation, UDOT and 
MVC/Southwest modified the contract's notice provisions, thereby excusing 
MVC/Southwest from the necessity of providing written notice to UDOT. UDOT's 
repeated verbal directions to MVC/Southwest to proceed with the work without requiring 
MVC/Southwest to provide written notice constitutes a clear modification of the 
contract's written notice requirements. If UDOT and MVC/Southwest had not intended 
to modify the notice requirements, UDOT would have requested MVC/Southwest to 
comply with the contract's written notification provisions rather than repeatedly directing 
MVC/Southwest to continue paving work. 
c. UDOT is Estopped From Enforcing the Contract's Notice 
Provisions. 
The trial court's conclusion that UDOT is estopped from enforcing the 
strict written notice provisions of the contract was accurate. As UDOT correctly states, 
estoppel requires "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted" that induces "reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to 
act," and a resulting "injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act." 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ^ 14, 158 P.3d 1088. 
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in me ins:: -^  ,;:sC. I '!)< >";"•; rcnenKv! th:vcii\, :> MVC s- : ;h^ . * • !•-.•* -h-)( n :i 
pave where ii wi>i;IJ re>uk in a greater than tvw nich vertical separation grade after 
receiving verbal notice from .w \ '. houinues: tnai sucii -.nrecuw^ would rcsuii ;n 
increased costs arid other negative ii npacts clearly coi istiti lie statements and acts on the 
part of UDOT which are inconsistent with its current claims that MVC/Southwest should 
have pro\ JUJL! l"i >* ; i ^i; ; ; written notice that UDO'I "s directives were extra work 
requiring additional compensatioi i I IDOTs repeated directi\ es to MVC/Southw est tc 
proceed with work caused MVC/Southwest to reasonably believe that there was no need 
"- provide written notice to UDOT since UDOT had alread\ made up its mind on the 
^ • • i K • ' - ' " . i A ' h i t 1 . ) - W ^ ^ ' H L i \ ! i . ••• •- • • u l I 111 mow i e l \ i mil t h e 
strict written notice provisions of the contract is inconsistent with its repeated directives 
to MVC/Southwest to continue work without requiring written notice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Coi irt shoi lid affirm the trial coi irt's i i zlii lgs 
mat: ( n MVC is entitled to damages resulting from I IDOTs refusal to allow ribbon 
paving on significant p,wu<n.. vi u c i- _ .. ianjeci: ; „ -> \ • v> l. breached the contract by 
interfering wil h and changing the 1 neans and methods by whicl i N 1\ 'C/Soi ithwest shoi lid 
have been allowed to pave the 1-215 Project and failing to pay for extra costs associated 
with said interference and change; (3) M V C/Southwesf s numerous verbal notices to 
1 IDC ) I throughoi it the course of the project of increased costs ai id other i legative impacts 
to MVC/Southwest due to UDOTs directives, constituted sufficient notice, thereby 
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excusing MVC/Southwest from complying with the strict notice provisions of the 
contract; and (4) UDOT modified, waived and is estopped from relying on the strict 
written notice provisions of the contract due to UDOT's course of conduct before, during 
and after the subject project. 
ARGUMENT 
(Relating to Cross-Appeal) 
I. MVC/Southwest Was Entitled to a 3/8 of an Inch Thickness Deficiency on 
Each of the Two Separate Layers of Asphalt Installed by MVC/Southwest. 
As discussed more fully below, the contract specifications for the 1-215 Project, 
which were drafted by UDOT, are ambiguous as to the allowable thickness deviations on 
the asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest. The trial court should have found that 
MVC/Southwest's position that it was entitled to a 3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on 
each of the two separate layers of asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest is the correct 
interpretation of the contract specifications relating to allowable thickness deviations. 
Pursuant to Utah law, "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies." Interwest Construction v. Palmer et al., 923 P.2d 
1350, 1359 (Utah 1996); Webbank v. American General Annuity Service Corp. et al., 
2002 UT 88,120; 54 P.3d 1139,1146 (Utah 2002). "When determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Lunceford v. 
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ^ 13; 139 P.3d 1073, 1075. "If a contract is ambiguous, 
the court will construe it against the drafter only after concluding that extrinsic evidence 
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does not reveal the intent of the parties and uncertainty remains." Allstate Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Heriford et ah, 772 P.2d 466, 469 (Utah Ci. App. 1989). 
In Kaczynsk: v. .•» Yidcira ^ raving, LLC . 2 = ^ * * • - ^-i •. . '•• /;K : t. 
2008), the plaintiff hired the defendant, a paving com^anv. lo install a new driveway. Id. 
at 1. The contract, which was prepared h\ the defendant paving compan>. vro\ ided that 
the aspnaii on me new driveway snoatu oc compac ts < .*• . ;;:. Aiic: ;ne driveway 
\\a-' i" in!* *d. i t ' j v ' a ? - u * cr 'V' •••/' rv:"/**!.'" ' ^ s / , '*'. -I *• kl.-u* !: :T.i^• , a r i o r '•" l.." 
things, that asphalt was not installed at the thickness required by the contract. Id. 
Specifically, the plaintiil ciaimce \t\d\ the contract required the defendant to "lay down 3 
IIKTK> ol'asphall :md eonipael it down lo "' inches ot thickness" bill thai Ihc ilclnidnnl 
failed to do so in several areas. Id. The defendant countered by arguing that the contract 
only required the defendant to lay down 3" to 2" of asphalt and then compact it. which 
w ould i neai l that tl te contract presumably allow ed foi the aspl lalt to be k ss thai I 2V after 
compaction. Id. 
Iii determining what the contract meant when it provided the asphalt should be 
con ipacted 3" to 2" , tl le court stated tl; lat " \ contract is ai i ibigi IOUS if 1 tl i.e] agreei i lent oi i 
its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretationT Id. at 2. The court 
determined that the contract was ambiguous, finding that the contract language " 3 " TO 2 r 
ASPI L VI • I COMP..,,/ \ C FEE) is reasoi lably susceptible of meaning e11ne; . i -\ y- ;• • :i:ree 
inches of asphalt which is then compacted, presumably to a lesser thicl ciiess, or (2) twe > to 
three inches of asphalt after compaction.'" Id. 
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In finding that the contract was ambiguous, the court determined that the extrinsic 
evidence, which consisted of testimony of the parties, did not significantly illuminate 
what the parties meant by the paving thickness language; rather it showed that the 
plaintiff understood it to mean one thing, while the defendant understood it to mean 
another. Id. The court held that because the contract was ambiguous, it must be 
construed against the drafter, which was the defendant, and found that in "Construing the 
contractual term against the defendant the court finds that the agreement called for 
asphalt measuring two to three inches after compaction." Id. 
In the instant case, the contract specifications relating to allowable thickness 
deviations in the asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest for the 1-215 Project are 
ambiguous and capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. The relevant contract 
specification addressing allowable thickness deviations is found in paragraph 1.4 of the 
contract specifications. Specifically, paragraph 1.4(E) states as follows: 
Thickness: Base acceptance on the average thickness of a lot A 
thickness lot equals a density lot. Divide a thickness lot into five sublots 
equal to density sublots. Thickness acceptance for thin lift projects (2 
inches or less) consists of checking thickness regularly with a depth probe 
during placement and taking corrective action as necessary. 
1. Take a minimum of two randomly selected thickness tests within 
each sublot. 
2. The same core samples taken for density may be used for 
thickness verification. 
3. The Department accepts a lot when: 
a. The average thickness of all sublots is not more than Vi 
inch greater nor 1/4 inch less than the total thickness 
specified. 
b. No individual sublot shows a deficient thickness of 
more than 3/8 of an inch. 
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(Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 1.4 (A) of the contract specifications state that "A lot equals the number 
of tons of HMA [hot mix asphalt] placed during each production day." (Trial Ex. 3 at 
345; Trial Ex. 103 at 345). (Emphasis added). 
On the 1-215 Project, UDOT and MVC/Southwest agreed that the total five inches 
of asphalt to be laid would be performed in two separate lifts on separate days; the first a 
three inch lift and the second a two inch lift. (R. 1421: 43-44; R. 1424: 639, 898; R. 
1515). Density and thickness were measured each day during the course of the 1-215 
Project and the same cores were used to measure both density and thickness consistent 
with paragraph 1.4(E)(2) of contract specifications. (R. 1421: 34, 36-37; R. 1515). 
After a majority of the paving work had been completed by MVC/Southwest, 
UDOT informed MVC/Southwest for the first time that some areas of the paving were 
deficient in thickness according to core measurement results. (R. 1421: 38, 64-65; R. 
1422: 465-466). In coming to this conclusion, UDOT only allowed for a 3/8 of an inch 
deficiency on the total five inches of asphalt laid. (R. 1421: 71, 103). In support of its 
position that MVC/Southwest was only entitled to a 3/8 of an inch deficiency on the total 
five inches, UDOT relied on paragraph 1.4(E)(3)(b) of the contract specifications, which 
states that "The Department accepts a lot when no individual sublot shows a deficient 
thickness of more than 3/8 of an inch." (R. 1424: 882-883, 917-918, 923-924; R. 1515; 
Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). UDOT ultimately assessed penalties against 
MVC/Southwest in the amount of $166,416.00. (R. 1425; 953). 
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The trial court found that the contract specifications relating to allowable thickness 
deviations were "less than clear." (R. 1515). Despite finding such, the trial court found 
that UDOT's interpretation of the allowable thickness deficiency was more reasonable 
and that the allowable thickness deficiency of 3/8 of an inch applied to the total thickness 
of the asphalt pavement (5 inches) and not to each individual lift (3 inch lift and 2 inch 
lift). (R. 1515-1516). Accordingly, the trial court denied MVC/Southwest's thickness 
claim of $166,416.00. (R. 1525). 
The trial court should have found that the contract specifications relating to 
allowable thickness deviations are ambiguous and that MVC/Southwest's interpretation 
that it was entitled to a 3/8 of an inch deficiency allowance on each individual lift that 
was laid (both the 3 inch lift and the 2 inch lift, for a total of 3/4 of an inch deficiency on 
the total 5 inches of thickness laid) was a reasonable interpretation of the contract 
specifications relating to allowable thickness deviations. 
Paragraph 1.4(E) sets forth the manner in which testing for thickness was to be 
conducted on the 1-215 Project. It states that UDOT will accept a lot when: (a) the 
average thickness of all sublots is not more than 1/2 inch greater nor 1/4 inch less than 
the total thickness specified; (b) no individual sublot shows a deficient thickness of 
more than 3/8 of an inch. (Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). The first question in 
determining what the allowable thickness deviation is requires an understanding of what 
constitutes a "lot" and a "sublot." Paragraph 1.4(A) states that "A lot equals the number 
of tons of HMA [hot mix asphalt] place during each production day." (Trial Ex. 3 at 
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345; Trial Ex. 103 at 345). (Emphasis added). Put more clearly, a "lot" is a day's 
production of asphalt (i.e. how much asphalt was installed by MVC/Southwest in one 
day). (R. 1424:931). 
As for what constitutes a "sublot", paragraph 1.4(A) clarifies that a sublot makes 
up part of a "lot" when it states: "Divide each lot into four sublots based on the 
scheduled production day." (Trial Ex. 3 at 345; Trial Ex. 103 at 345). Therefore, a 
"sublot" is part of a day's production of asphalt. 
Clearly, as set forth above, the contract specifications state that thickness was to 
be measured in lots and sublots, which constitutes a day's production of asphalt installed. 
On the 1-215 Project, UDOT and MVC/Southwest agreed that the total five inches of 
asphalt to be laid would be performed in two separate lifts on separate days; the first a 
three inch lift and the second a two inch lift. (R. 1421: 43-44; R. 1424: 639, 898; R. 
1515). Therefore, the three inch lift performed within a day's production would 
constitute a "lot", while the two inch lift performed on a different day would constitute a 
separate "lot". 
On the 1-215 Project, measurements (core samples) to determine thickness were 
performed each day. (R. 1421: 34, 36-37, 42; R. 1515). Pursuant to paragraph 
1.4(E)(3)(b), which is what UDOT used in determining thickness, and MVC/Southwest's 
position, MVC/Southwest was entitled to a 3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on each 
individual sublot (i.e., 3/8 of an inch on each sublot included in the 3 inch lift, and an 
additional 3/8 of an inch on each sublot included in the 2 inch lift for a total of 3/4 of an 
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inch deficiency on the total five inches installed by MVC/Southwest). (R. 1421: 43, 69, 
71, 75, 103;1424: 926-927; R. 1424: 882-883, 917-918, 923-924; R. 1425: 952-953; R. 
1515; Trial Ex. 3 at 346; Trial Ex. 103 at 346). However, MVC/Southwest was only 
given 3/8 of an inch deficiency and was penalized $166,416.00 as a result of UDOT's 
and the trial court's erroneous interpretation of the allowable thickness deviation. 
UDOT was responsible for crafting clear and coherent contract specifications 
relating to allowable thickness deviations, which it failed to do. Paragraph 1.4 is 
confusing and ambiguous and capable of more than one reasonable interpretation; namely 
MVC/Southwesf s interpretation that paragraph 1.4 allows for a 3/8 of an inch deficiency 
on both the three inch lift and the two inch lift, for a total 3/4 of an inch deficiency on the 
total five inches of thickness. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, find that the 
contract specifications relating to allowable thickness deviations are ambiguous, find that 
MVC/Southwest's interpretation of the allowable thickness deviations is reasonable and 
instruct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of MVC/Southwest on the thickness 
reduction claim. 
II. MVC/Southwest is Entitled to Interest on its Damages From November 11, 
2003, the Time its Damages Were Calculable With Reasonable Mathematical 
Accuracy. 
Pursuant to Utah case law, "Prejudgment interest may be recovered where 
the damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the 
loss is measurable by facts and figures." Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, 
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LLC, 2009 UT 7, Tj 51; 210 P.3d 263. "If sufficient certainty exists, courts should allow 
interest from the time when damages became fixed, rather than from the date of the 
judgment." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). See also, Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 20, n.5; 82 P.3d 1064, 1069 
("Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular 
time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from 
that time.. . "). See also, Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("The 
statutory legal rate of interest is applied from the date payment is due to the judgment 
date."). 
However, it is not required "all of the damage figures must be known and remain 
static throughout the litigation. Rather, the standard focuses on the measurability and 
calculability of the damages." Encon Utah. LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer. LLC, 2009 UT 
7, f 52. The fact that "parties dispute or reduce the amount of damages does not in and of 
itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy." Id. at ^ 58. 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly determined that MVC/Southwest was 
entitled to prejudgment interest of 10% per annum on its awarded damages of 
$548,832.52. (R. 1425: 1048; R. 1525). However, the trial court incorrectly determined 
that prejudgment interest did not begin to accrue until November 1, 2004, which was 
approximately one year after the 1-215 Project was completed and approximately one 
year after MVC/Southwest's increased costs had been determined with reasonable 
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mathematical certainty on November 11, 2003. (R. 1425: 968-969, 1048; R. 1525; Trial 
Ex. 24). 
Specifically, by November 11, 2003, MVC/Southwest had compiled a detailed 
analysis of increased costs suffered by MVC/Southwest due to UDOT's directive that 
ribbon paving not be used by MVC/Southwest on certain areas of the 1-215 Project. (R. 
1421: 113-150; Trial Ex. 24). In the cost analysis, Mike Moehn of Southwest identified 
in detail the amount of MVC/Southwest's increased costs, which included amounts for 
increased paving costs, labor costs, equipment costs, supervision costs, grinding costs, 
testing costs, trucking costs and materials costs. (R. 1421: 113-150; Trial Ex. 24). 
Together with an itemization of these increased costs, Mike Moehn detailed the means 
and methods utilized by him to determine the amount of the increased costs and the 
sources of information used by him to determine the increased costs, including 
production reports, job accounting reports, job cost details, summary reports, time cards, 
equipment cards, subcontractor/supplier invoices, equipment usage reports, bid 
information, cost distribution summaries and labor reports. (R. 1421: 113-150; Trial Ex. 
24). 
As to MVC/Southwest's increased cost analysis compiled on November 11, 2003, 
the trial court specifically ruled that "Mike Moehn's methods in determining Meadow 
Valley/Southwest's damages that occurred due to UDOT's requirement that Meadow 
Valley/Southwest not ribbon pave portions of the Project were reliable, credible, 
accurate, and reasonable." (R. 1513, 1524). The trial court also ruled that "UDOT failed 
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to present any evidence suggesting that Mr. Moehn's methods in determining damages 
relating to Meadow Valley/Southwest not being allowed to ribbon pave portions of the 
Project were anything but reliable, credible, accurate, and reasonable." (R. 1513). 
As there is no question that MVC/Southwest's increased costs compiled on 
November 11, 2003, were reliable, credible, accurate and reasonable, pursuant to the case 
law cited above, the Court should have ruled that November 11, 2003, was the date 
prejudgment interest should have begun to accrue, rather than November 1, 2004, 
because MVC/Southwest's increased costs were complete, measurable and calculable by 
reliable facts and figures by no later than November 11, 2003. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the trial court erred in establishing 
November 1, 2004 as the date interest on MVC/Southwest's damages began to accrue 
and rule that interest on MVC/Southwest's damages should accrue beginning on 
November 11,2003. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
that MVC/Southwest was only entitled to a 3/8 of an inch thickness deficiency on the 
total thickness of the asphalt installed by MVC/Southwest and find that MVC/Southwest 
was entitled to 3/8 of an inch deficiency on each of the two layers installed by 
MVC/Southwest, for a total 3/4 of an inch deficiency on the total asphalt thickness. The 
contract specifications relating to allowable thickness deviations in asphalt thickness are 
ambiguous and MVC/Southwest's interpretation that is entitled to 3/8 of an inch 
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deficiency on each of the two layers installed is reasonable. This Court should remand 
this matter back to the trial court and instruct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of 
MVC/Southwest on the thickness reduction claim. 
In addition, this Court should find that the trial court erred in establishing 
November 1, 2004 as the date interest on MVC/Southwest's damages began to accrue 
and find that November 11, 2003 is the date that interest on the damages begins to accrue. 
MVC/Southwest's damages were calculable with reasonable mathematical certainty by 
November 11,2003. 
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